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Ir\ rfHE SUPREME COURT
0~~ rf,Hr~

STATE OF UTAH
THE ST:\TE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

Case No.10004.

JERRY DELOUD LEGGROAN,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The appellant has appealed from his conviction for the
crime of robbery in violation of 76-51-1, U.C.A. 1953.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was tried upon jury trial in the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, and was found
guilty of the crime of robbery and sentenced to be committed to the State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the judgment of the trial
court should be affirmed.
ST~~ TEMENT

OF FACTS
The respondent adopts the statement of facts set out in
the appellant's brief except to the extent that the record
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may reveal that they have not been stated in a light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, and to the extent that they
may be supplemented in the argument portion of this brief.
Appellant raises three points on appeal, all of which relate to the question of whether or not the trial court should
have allowed the Preliminary hearing testimony of Robert
S. Ross, a witness to the robbery, who was unavailable at
trial, to be read to the jury.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING THE
TRANSCRIPT OF THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT S. ROSS,
GIVEN AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING OF THE APPELLANT'S TRIAL, TO BE RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE IN THE
ABSENCE OF AN ATTEMPT BY THE PROSECUTION TO
OBTAIN THE PRESENCE OF MR. ROSS, PURSUANT TO
77-45-13, U.C.A. 1953.

Appellant, in his first point, contends that it was error
for the trial court to allow the transcript of the testimony
of Robert S. Ross, given at preliminary hearing, to be
received by the jury in the absence of a showing that the
prosecution attempted to procure Mr. Ross pursuant to
77-45-13, U.C.A. 1953. 77-45-13, U.C.A. 1953 is part of
the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses
from Without the State in Criminal Cases. The Act was
adopted in Utah in 1937 and allows the State to secure the
attendance of witnesses from outside the jurisdiction where
the state in which the proposed witness is also located recognizes by comity the request of the State of Utah. The act
provides for the attendance of the witness in the requesting
state but after a hearing has been held on the matter. (Uniform Act, Sec. 2 ) .
In the instant case, the witness, Mr. Ross, could not be
located in the State of Utah. An attempt was made by the
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Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office to serve a summons upon
the \vitness, but he was apparently not present \vithin the
State of Utah as the subpoena could not be served and there
\ras no record of any residence in the State of Utah. His
last known address was listed as 309A North Street, Sausalito, California. The witness was, therefore, not available to
process from the State of Utah in the absence of the application of the Uniform Act.
It is well settled that the absence of a witness from the
state is a sufficient reason for allowing the testimony of the
\vitness previously given at preliminary hearing to be read
to the jury. State v. Vance, 38 Utah 1, 110 Pac. 434 ( 1910).
The appellant argues that the Uniform Act embodied in
Chapter 45 of Title 77, U.C.A. 1953, should change that
rule, and that an additional requirement should be met that
the prosecution attempt to obtain the attendance of the
\ritness pursuant to the act.
It does not appear that this court has previously considered this matter. However, those jurisdictions that have
have uniformly rejected the argument now advanced by the
appellant. At the outset, it should be noted that 77-45-13
does not make mandatory the requirement that the prosecution attempt to obtain a witness who is out of state. The
act expressly states (77-45-12, 13) that the court "may"
secure the attendance of witnesses after going through the
procedure required by the act, including the right to a hearing. The act in no way indicates that its provisions are
mandatory in criminal cases, but rather, the act appears
to be discretionary and permissive based upon the needs of
the parties, the materiality of the witness's testimony and
the hardship to the witness in providing for his return.
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In People v. Serra, 301 Mich. 124, 3 N.W.2d 35 ( 1942),
the Michigan Supreme Court was faced with a similar contention that the Uniform Act made it mandatory that the
prosecution attempt to obtain the presence of a material
\vitness by the act. The question posed by the court was:
"It is conceded that the prosecution made no attempt to procure
the return of Briggs from New York under this statute. Was the
failure to do so reversible error? * * *"

The court then went on to note:
"* * * It is not error for the court to refuse to compel the prosecution to call witnesses whose names are endorsed on the information who are not within the State and answerable to process of the
court. * * * "

In considering the effect of the Uniform Act, the Michigan
Supreme Court stated:
"***Does the 1931 statute, supra, change the common-law rule?
It does not in express terms impose any duty on the prosecutor to
apply to the court for a certificate, or to make application to a
judge of a court of record in another State for any process under
the laws of that State. It imposes no mandate that the court of
either State shall act- the issuance of the certificate is discretionary. Seemingly, either the prosecution or the defense may
avail itself of the procedure offered."
***
"The Michigan law does not make it mandatory that the prosecution apply to the court in another State for process to compel
return of a witness to this State. The procedure is optional with
either the prosecution or the defense. In the case at bar, the defendants had full knowledge, and equal opportunity. The showing of diligence was sufficient to excuse the people from the requirement to produce Briggs as a witness. The prosecutor is not
required to resort to the procedure referred to in this statute."

The court went on to note that the necessity of the hearing
in the state where the witness is located and the fact that
the act is dependent upon comity makes difficult, at best,
the securing of a witness by the use of the Uniform Act, and
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felt that such difficulties \vcre sufficient reasons so that the
Legislature did not intend that the act be an obstacle to be
complied with before the prosecution could validly dispense
with the testimony of a material witness.
Subsequently, in People v. Hunley, 313 Mich. 688, 21
N.W.2d 923 ( 1946), the Michigan Supreme Court considered the identical problem now before this court. The
testimony of a witness subsequently absent from the state
was allowed to be received in evidence based upon a transcript of his testimony given at preliminary hearing. The
court rejected the same contention made by the appellant
in the instant case. It did so stating:
"* * * In People v. Serra, 301 Mich. 124, 3 N.W.2d 35, we held
that the statute was not mandatory; the prosecution need not
apply for a certificate so as to extradite a material witness in a
pending cause. The statute authorizing the requiring of bail by a
material witness permits the court to demand it if he believes that
there would be a loss of the testimony of such witness if he does
not attend. There could not be a loss of the testimony of this witness as he had already testified. Testimony taken before a magistrate may be read if the witness is not present and reasonable effort
has been made to subpoena the witness. In People v. Veitenheimer, 229 Mich. 409, 201 N.W. 475, we held that upon a showing that the witness had enlisted in the army and was not in the
State, his testimony taken at the examination could be read. See
also, People v. Gibson, 253 Mich. 476, 235 N.W. 225; People v.
Droste, 160 Mich. 66, 125 N.W. 87. Nor is the fact that defendant
did not have an attorney at the hearing before the magistrate but
cross-examined the witness herself sufficient reason for not using
Carue's testimony. In People v. Myers, 239 Mich. 105, 214 N.W.
130, we held that the testimony before an examining magistrate
might be read at the subsequent trial even though there had been
no previous cross-examination of the witness, it being only necessary that an opportunity for cross-examination had been present.***"

The Court of Appeals of Maryland in Conte v. State,
184 A.2d 823 ( Md. 1962), in a dicta pronouncement recognized and approved the Michigan decisions. In doing so,
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the court noted a holding of the Supreme Court of the State
of Arizona in State v. ]ordanJ 83 Ariz. 248, 320 P.2d 466, in
which that court ruled that the act was permissive and not
mandatory.
In People v. DayJ 219 Cal. 562,27 P.2d (Cal. 1933), the
California Supreme Court was faced with a claim of error
that the trial court had acted improperly in allowing the
testimony of a witness given at preliminary hearing to be
received over objection in the absence of an attempt by the
prosecution to provide for the attendance of the witness by
bail bond. The court rejected the contention that the District Attorney was under a mandatory duty to proceed pursuant to statute to secure the attendance of the material
witness. The court stated:
"The District Attorney was not bound to proceed under that section."

The court affirmed the conviction.
In People v. LinerJ 168 Cal. App. 2d 411, 335 P.2d 964
( 1959), an objection to the use of the testimony of a material witness given at preliminary hearing was predicated
upon the failure of the prosecution to attempt to secure the
presence of the witness under the Uniform Act (Penal
Code, Sees. 1334 to 1334.6). The court rejected the contention that the trial court acted improperly in allowing
the use of such evidence. The court stated:
"Appellant contends that the trial court erred in permitting the
testimony of George Katz taken at the preliminary hearing to be
given as evidence at the trial, claiming that the prosecution should
have been required to utilize sections 1334-1334.6 of the Penal
Code relating to procuring the attendance of a witness outside
the state of California. The questioned testimony was properly
admitted under the provisions of section 686, subdivision 3, of the
Penal Code, which provides that the deposition of a witness at the
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preli~inary

hearing may be read at the trial upon it being satisfactonly shown that the witness can not with due diligence be
found within the state.

***

Apparently the precise question here involved has not been passed
upon by the courts of this state. However, in People v. Cahan,
14-l Cal. App. 2d 891,297 P.2d 715, Lee Cobert, the victim of a
robbery, was in Las Vegas, Nevada, at the time of trial and the
court permitted the prosecution to read in evidence his testimony
taken at the preliminary hearing. The defendant requested a continuance for the purpose of taking Cobert's deposition under the
Uniform Act to secure the attendance of witnesses from without
the state in criminal cases. Pen. Code, sees. 1334-1334.6. Therequest was denied and it was held that the court did not abuse its
discretion in denying a continuance.
In the instant case we find no reversible error in the action of the
trial court in permitting the prosecution to read in evidence the
testimony of George Katz taken at the preliminary hearing."

In People v. Terry, 4 Cal. Rep. 597, 180 Cal. App. 2d
48 ( 1960) , the court rejected a contention identical with
that now urged by the appellant. It did so stating:
"It is also contended that the attendance of the witnesses should
have been compelled by utilizing Section 1334 et seq. of the Penal
Code. With the consent of the reciprocating state, this statute provides a method whereby a witness can be compelled to travel to
the jurisdiction and to testify even against his will. Appellant concedes, in line with established authority, that the District Attorney
has no obligation to resort to this statute as a condition precedent
to the introduction of the testimony desired. People v. Liner, 168
Cal. App. 2d 411, 415-416, 335 P.2d 964; People v. Cahan, 141
Cal. App. 2d 891, 901, 297 P.2d 715. Also, we are not persuaded,
as appellant has suggested, that we should overturn the weight of
authority thus cited. What has been said with respect to the application of Section 1334 et seq. is also true of Section 879 of the
same code, which latter statute provides a technique whereby
prospective witnesses can be bound where there is reason to believe
that they may leave the jurisdiction. The cases hold that this section is merely permissive. People v. Day, 219 Cal. 562, 565, 27
P.2d 909; People v. Myers, 77 Cal. App. 10, 15, 245 P. 1106."

The overwhelming weight of judicial authority appears
to reject the position urged by the appellant. Indeed, there
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is much merit to the position of the courts on this matter.
First, the presence of the witness can only be obtained after
complicated proceedings dependent, in part, upon the comity of another jurisdiction. Second, where the accused has
been afforded an opportunity to examine the witness at preliminary hearing, his constitutional prerogatives have been
preserved and, in the absence of some extremely compelling
reason, his position would be no different were the witness
to appear.
This court should adopt the reasoning of the above cited
decisions for the reasons advanced in those opinions. Additionally, since a Uniform Act is involved, uniformity of construction and interpretation should be sought after. Further, since the decisions of other states have construed an
act similar to that of this state, sound judicial administration favors a similar result in the absence of some more
compelling local policy. The appellant's position is without merit.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING THE
TRANSCRIPT OF THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERTS. ROSS
TO BE READ TO THE JURY OF THE WITNESS'S PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY WHERE THE TRANSCRIPT
DID NOT RECITE THE BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION OF
THE WITNESS.

The appellant contends that the trial court committed
error in allowing the preliminary hearing testimony of
Robert S. Ross, a witness unavailable for trial, to be read to
the jury where the testimony did not indicate or recite the
business or profession of the witness. Appellant relies upon
77-15-14 ( 1), which provides:
"* * * The deposition or testimony of the witness must be authenticated in the following form:
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( 1) I~ mu~t state the name of the witness, his place of residence
and hts bustness or profession.''

It should be noted that 77-15-14 does not indicate that the
authentication is necessary before the testimony may be
used in evidence. It merely provides that this will be a
means of authenticating the preliminary hearing transcript
where ( 1 ) the trial involves a homicide, or ( 2) where the
prosecution requests a transcript of the testimony. State v.
Sheffield, 45 Utah 426, 146 Pac. 306. Since there is nothing
in the statute that makes the requirement that the testimony state the business or profession before it may be used
as an exception to the hearsay rule under the common law
rules, it is submitted that there is no impediment to the use
of such testimony at trial. As noted in McCormick, Evidence ( 1954), p. 481:
"* * * The usual approach, however, is that these statutes on
former testimony are 'declaratory' of the common law, so far as
they go, and not the exclusive test of admissibility. Accordingly, if
the evidence meets the common law requirements, it will usually
come in even though the permissive provisions of the statute do
not mention the particular common law doctrine which the evidence satisfies, * * *."

See State v. Ham, 224 N. Car. 128, 29 S.E.2d 449 ( 1954),
in which the North Carolina Supreme Court indicated that
the absence of a proper certification was not an impediment
to the use of the testimony given at a former hearing.
77-44-3, U.C.A. 1953, expressly covers the instances
when testimony given at a previous hearing and stenographically reported, may be received in evidence in the
absence of the witness at the time of trial. That section
provides:
"Whenever in any court of record the testimony of any witness in
any criminal case shall be stenographically reported by an official
court reporter, and thereafter such witness shall die or be beyond
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the jurisdiction of the court in which the cause is pending, either
party to the action may read in evidence the testimony of such
witness, when duly certified by the reporter to be correct, in any
subsequent trial of, or proceeding had in, the same cause, subject
only to the same objections that might be made, if such witness
were upon the stand and testifying in open court."

It should be noted that the only condition to the receipt
of the evidence is that the reporter who took the testimony
must certify that the testimony as given is correct. There
is no indication that the testimony contain any particular
questions or answers. Consequently, it is submitted that
77-44-3, U.C.A. 1953, determines the admissibility and
use of preliminary hearing testimony and that 77-15-14
relates only to authentication for court purposes, and is no
inhibition to the use of the evidence at the time of trial.
Much support for this position is to be found from 77-1531, U.C.A. 1953, which provides for deposition testimony
and indicates further that the stenographer need only certify to the evidence. This court has in many instances recognized the use of previous testimony given at a preliminary
hearing where the witness is subsequently absent at the time
of trial.
In State v. VigilJ 123 Utah 495, 260 P.2d 539 ( 1953),
this court noted :
"It was proper for the court to admit into evidence the transcript
of the preliminary hearing. The law requires that if such witness
is beyond the jurisdiction of the court or cannot with due diligence
be found within the state either party may read in evidence the
testimony of such witness.
The evidence also shows that one officer testified as to his personal
knowledge that the Shorts had left the state. This, with the other
facts shown, was sufficient to, and did satisfy the court that the
Shorts were beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and thus therequirements of the law were satisfied."

The court in that case relied upon 77-44-3 and 77-1-8,
U.C.A. 1953.
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This court has in numerous other instances allowed the
testimony of witnesses given at preliminary hearing to be
used at the time of trial where the witness is without the
jurisdiction. State v. Gorham, 93 Utah 274, 72 P.2d 656
( 1937) ; State v. DePretto, 48 Utah 249, 155 Pac. 336
(1916); State v. Anderson, 68 Utah 551, 251 Pac. 362
( 1926); State v. King, 24 Utah 482, 68 Pac. 418 ( 1902) ;
State v. Vance, 38 Utah 1, 110 Pac. 434 ( 1910); State v.
Inlow, 44 Utah 485, 141 Pac. 530 ( 1914); State v. Greene,
38 Utah 389, 115 Pac. 181 (1910); Annotations 15 ALR
495, 79ALR 1392; 122ALR425.
Even if it were conceded that the authentication provisions of 77-15-14 were a condition that should be complied
with for authentication purposes, still it would appear that
it is not a condition mandatory in the absence of which
testimony given at a preliminary hearing could not be received in evidence. Although appellant makes some argument that the provisions must be deemed mandatory because the word "must" is used, in People v. O'Shaughnessy,
26 P.2d 84 7 (Cal. 1933), the California court had occasion
to consider Section 869 of the California Penal Code, which
is identical with Section 77-15-14, U.C.A. 1953. The appellant in that case had contended it was error to use the
testimony at preliminary hearing in the absence of a showing from the transcript as to the witness's business or profession. The California court without deciding whether or not
the compliance with the statute was necessary in the first
instance, ruled that the provision relating to business or profession was directory and not mandatory. The court stated:
"The action of the court in receiving into evidence the record of the
testimony given by Miss Johnson at ~e p~eliminary ~earin~ ~s
assigned as error. It is first urged that th1s eVIde~ce was Inadrmssible because Miss Johnson was not asked and did not state what
was her business or profession. Pen Code, § 869. It appears that
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this witness was a female person, that she was living in the home
of another woman, and the record does not show her age . If it
may not be presumed that she had no business (see People v. Grundell, 75 Cal. 301, 17 P. 214), at least it must be held that this provision is directory merely and not mandatory (People v. Grundell,
supra; People v. Buckley, 143 Cal. 375, 77 P. 169). The appellant
argues that had this witness stated her business, it would appear
that she was a woman of the streets and that for this reason the
jury would not have believed her testimony. Not only does this
go to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility, but
the record contains no evidence of the fact claimed, and it may
not be assumed that the jury would have disbelieved her testimony when it coincided in every detail with statements made by
the appellant."

Numerous other cases have ruled in a similar fashion that
authentication requirements in preliminary hearing statutes or other statutes relating to depositions are not conditions precedent to the receipt of the testimony. State v.
Maynard, 184 N. Car. 653, 113 S.E. 682 ( 1922); Serna v.
State, 110 Tex. Crim. 220, 7 S.W.2d 543 (1928).
A similar argument to that of the appellant was urged in
State v. Maslick, 59 Utah 75, 202 Pac. 6 ( 1921), where
there was a failure to file the transcript notes with the court,
as required by statute. In rejecting a contention that the
use of the preliminary hearing testimony was precluded,
the court stated:
"* * *The transcript being concededly true and correct, appellant
could not possibly sustain prejudice or injury from the absence of
the stenographic notes. * * *"

See 79 ALR 1420.
Finally, since this court must weigh for specific error
77--42-1, U.C.A. 1953, even if the appellant's position were
correct, it must be determined whether the failure to designate the business or profession of the witness Ross could be
deemed prejudicial to the appellant at trial. Obviously it
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could not. The importance of Ross' testimony was not his
connection \\'ith the appellant, but whether or not his ability to identify the appellant as the culprit was in anyway
diminished. His business or profession would in most instances be irrelevant to this question. It can hardly be said
that there \vas any prejudice from the failure to meet the
authentication requirement.
Finally, as noted above in McCormick, infra, p. 9, most
statutes are not demed to supplant the common law rule,
but are felt to supplement it and are declaratory only. Consequently, since in the instant case the parties and issues
were the same as at the time of preliminary hearing, the
testimony is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Edition, Sec. 1370, 1371; McCormick, Evidence, Ch. 26, p. 480 ( 1954).
CONCLUSION
The appellant's position, when analyzed against the
cases from other jurisdictions which have concerned themselves \Vith the arguments now before this court, is of little
merit. An analysis of judicial precedents and the logic and
statutory requirements attendant to the use of former testimony can only lead to the conclusion that there was no injustice done to the appellant in the instant case.
This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General

RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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